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Navratil: Examining the Seventh Circuit's Repudiation of the Transformative

EXAMINING THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S
REPUDIATION OF THE TRANSFORMATIVE
FAIR USE ANALYSIS: KIENITZ V. SCONNIE
NATION, LLC.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Fair use is often regarded as an inconsistent doctrine
because although it is significant to United States copyright law,
there are many elements of the fair use analysis that are greatly
Fair use has been unpredictable and varied in its
disputed.
As technology continues to,
application among the circuits.
advance, new innovation increasingly necessitates the reimagining
and reinterpretation of what is copyrightable. To this end, and to
help enhance the predictability of fair use analysis in future
jurisprudence, it is important to have a national standard grounded
in Supreme Court precedent.
This article argues that although Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation,
LLC was correctly decided, the rationale of the opinion is flawed
and does not serve to clarify the confusion regarding the fair use
analysis going forward. In Section II, this article will review the
background of fair use, from its common law origins to its
codification, and will address informative case law. In Section III,
this article will argue that the Kienitz opinion is incorrect in its
assertion that the "transformative use" analysis will impinge on the
protected right of derivative works because the rise of
transformative use analysis can be understood as an outcome of
Congressional desire to craft a broad fair use statute that would
allow judges case-by-case discretion. Furthermore, the section
argues that the Kienitz opinion is flawed for favoring the market
effect factor over the transformative use factor because of the
inherent flaws in the market effect analysis. Section IV discusses
the future implications of the Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation, LLC
decision on fair use jurisprudence, both within and outside the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, before concluding the overall
discussion.
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BACKGROUND

One perspective promulgated by legal scholars is that the
fundamental impetus of American copyright law is utilitarianism.'
Under utilitarian theory, copyright law grants exclusive rights for a
limited amount of time to authors as an incentive to create works
for the benefit of society. 2 Without guaranteed rights in their
creative production, authors would face the problem of free riding,
effectively preventing them from profiting from their own works. 3
The utilitarian theory is reflected in the Copyright Clause of the
Constitution, which allows Congress to give authors and creators
exclusive rights to their works in order to "...promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts." 4 The Copyright Clause, however,
necessitates limitations on the rights provided to authors.5 In order
to balance the interests of promoting the public welfare without
diminishing the incentive to create, 6 copyright law excuses a
specific subset of third-party unauthorized use of copyrighted
works as "fair use." 7 The fair use doctrine is a practical doctrine
because it serves to promote continuous creation; however, a use is
not fair if it significantly weakens the value of the original
copyrighted work.
Fair use has an important and lengthy history in American
copyright jurisprudence. Fair use originally existed as part of
judge-made common law, but the factors that are recognizable

i William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright

Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989).
2 See

Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter's, 471 U.S. 539, 558
(1985) ("By establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression,
copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.").
3 Jeanne C. Fromer, Market Effects Bearingon Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV.
615, 620 (2015).
4 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
Mark A. Lemley, The Economics ofimprovement in IntellectualProperty
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 997, 1014 (1997).
6 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's'
creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good... the Copyright Act must be construed in
light of this basic purpose.")
' 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
8 See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994).
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today were first outlined by Justice Story in 1841,9 and evolved
into the statutory factors codified into the Copyright Act of 1976.10
The non-exclusive factors considered in the fair use analysis are:
(1) The purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) The nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) The amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
(4) The effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work."
The legislative history of the fair use defense highlights the intent
of Congress that "there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in
the statute,"l 2 showing that fair use is meant to be a flexible
Congressional records
analysis adaptive to many scenarios.
underscore that "beyond the very broad statutory explanation of
what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts
must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a caseby-case basis." 3 After fair use was codified in the Copyright Act
of 1976, judges nonetheless continued to face many uncertainties
about how to approach the fair use analysis. 1 4
In the early 1980s, the Supreme Court first addressed fair use
with regard to commercial uses, affirming in two decisions that
commercial uses are considered presumptively unfair.' 5 Soon
after, the Supreme Court bolstered this presumption by
9 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (Mass. Cir. Ct. 1841). Justice Story outlined
the fair use factors that have grown into the specific four that were codified in
1976.
1o 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
11 Id.
12 H.R.
13 id.

REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976).

Pierre N. Leval, TowardA Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1105,
1106 (1990).
15 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451
(1984) ("[E]very commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an
unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the
copyright."); see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Ents., 471 U.S.
539, 562 (1985).
14
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emphasizing the fourth fair use factor, the "market effect" of the
infringement, as the most important factor. 16 As a result, it would
be difficult for any commercial use to successfully claim the fair
use defense under a market-centered paradigm of the fair use
analysis where all commercial use is immediately suspect.1
The publication of an influential law review article by Pierre
N. Leval,' 8 and the United States Supreme Court decision in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,19 launched a new paradigm
for understanding fair use jurisprudence. The Campbell decision
held that in conducting the fair use analysis, the first factor should
be utilized to determine if a new use is transformative, and the
degree to which the challenged work is transformed from the
The Supreme Court also
original copyrighted work.20
reconsidered its position in the Sony decision that commercial uses
should be considered presumptively unfair, 2 1 and went on to
strengthen the first factor of the analysis by holding that the more
transformative the new work, the less the other factors, like
commercialism, may weigh against a finding of fair use.22
Campbell also reaffirmed the Supreme Court's position that the
fair use factors are analyzed under fact-intensive inquiries and
should be considered together and evaluated on a case-by-case
basis without any bright line rules. 23
A. Cariouv. Prince- Backgroundand Decision
In 2000, photographer Patrick Cariou published a book of
portraits and landscape photographs called Yes Rasta.24 The
See generallyHarper& Row, 471 U.S. 539.
1 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense ofFair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 715, 722 (2011) (commenting that under market-centered fair use analysis
it was "very unlikely that any use deemed 'commercial' would also qualify as
16

fair use.").
18 Leval, supra note 14.
2190 Campbell

v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 569 (1994).

d.

See id. at 594 ("It was error for the Court of Appeals to conclude that the
commercial nature of 2 Live Crew's parody of 'Oh, Pretty Woman' rendered it
presumptively
unfair.").
22
Id. at 569.
23 Id. at 577 (citing Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 560).
24 CartioU v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 2013).
21
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images in the book were photographs taken by Cariou over a
period of six years that he spent living with the Rastafarian people
of Jamaica.25 Richard Prince, an appropriation artist,26 altered and
then integrated several of Cariou's photographs from Yes Rasta
into a series of works Prince called Canal Zone that was later
exhibited in 2007 and 2008 in two galleries. 27 Cariou sued Prince
and Gagosian Gallery, and argued that Prince infringed his
copyrights in the published photographs.2 8
Prince countered that his series of artworks were fair use, but
in ruling on summary judgment, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York held that in order to satisfy
the transformative nature of the first fair use factor the new work
had to "comment on, relate to the historical context of, or critical
refer back to the original works." 2 9 Prince's deposition reflected
that he did not intend to comment on Cariou or his work, and that
he had no interest in what Cariou's original intent was for the Yes
Rasta photographs. 3 0 Relying heavily on the artist's statements,
the district court rejected Prince's fair use defense and granted
Cariou injunctive relief, ordering Prince to deliver all infringing
materials to Cariou. 3 1
The Second Circuit reversed in part and reviewed the district
court's grant of summary judgment on a de novo basis.32 The
Second Circuit held that the district court applied an incorrect
standard while determining whether Prince's use of Cariou's
photographs was a fair use.3 3 The Second Circuit went on to
clarify that the "law imposes no requirement that a work comment
on the original or its author in order to be transformative. . ."34
The Second Circuit also noted that the United States Supreme

25 id.

26

Id. at 699.

Id. at 698. Gagosian Gallery also "published and sold an exhibition catalog
that contained reproductions of Prince's paintings and images from Prince's
workshop."
27

28 Id.

Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 348-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
1Id. at 349.
3' Id. at 351, 355.
32 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 704,
712.
" Id. at 707.
34
Id. at 706.
29

30
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Court has previously held that in order to qualify as fair use, a new
work generally must alter the original with "new expression,
meaning, or message."3 5 More importantly, in addressing Prince's
deposition comments about having no interest in Cariou's original
intent for the photographs, Judge Parker, writing for the Second
Circuit, stated that Prince's lack of interest or intentional
commentary on Cariou's original work was not dispositive.36
The Second Circuit opined that instead of focusing on
Prince's artistic rationale, the court should instead examine how
the works may "reasonably be perceived" 37 in order to evaluate
their transformative status.3 8 Toward this end, the Second Circuit
found the Seventh Circuit's decision in Brownmark Films, LLC v.
Comedy Partners instructive. 3 9 In that case, Judge Parker noted
that evaluating parody as a fair use is determined by viewing the
works side by side. 4 0 Furthermore, only the original video and the
new work were necessary to decide the question of fair use. 4' The
Second Circuit similarly went on to analyze the two works in the
same manner and found that the Prince's works have "a different
character...expression, and employ new aesthetics with creative
and communicative results distinct from Cariou's." 42 The court
.also analyzed the works and found that some of Prince's work did
not alter the original photograph to any appreciable extent, while
in others "the entire source photograph is used but is also heavily
obscured and altered..."4 3 The court held that while five of
Prince's works did not qualify as fair uses because Cariou's
original "work is readily apparent," 44 Prince's remaining twenty45
five works were held to be permissible fair uses.

35
Id. at 704 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579).
36
Id. at 707.
37 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582).
38
39

id.
id.

40 Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir.
2012).
41

Id. at 690.

42 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 708.
43 Id. at 710.
44

Id. at 701.

45 Id. at 706, 710, 712.
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ANALYSIS

A. Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation, LLC Background and Decision

'

Michael Kienitz, as a journalist and photographer from
Madison, Wisconsin, earned a living working as a journalist and
photographer. 4 6 Kienitz was careful throughout his career about
how he licensed his work because he wanted to be able to approve
During the inauguration
of the uses of his photographs.4 7
ceremony for Mayor Soglin in April 2011, Kienitz photographed
the mayor and his family, 4 8 and shortly after the ceremony, Mayor
Soglin's office obtained permission from Kienitz to use the
photograph. 4 9 Kienitz did not charge a licensing fee in this
instance and permitted the Mayor and his office to use the
photograph for noncommercial purposes.5o The photograph was
later placed on the City of Madison's official website with a photo
credit in the lower right hand corner that recognized Kienitz as the
author.5
In March 2012, controversy circulated over an upcoming
block party known as the "Mifflin Street Block Party."5 2 This
party is an annual event that started in 1969 as part of a series of
student protests on the University of Wisconsin-Madison
campus. 5 3 While a student at UW-Madison, Mayor Soglin was
notoriously arrested at the first block party.5 4 Sconnie Nation LLC
and Underground Printing-Wisconsin LLC decided to create
apparel displaying the phrase "Sorry For Partying" over the image
of the Mayor to allude to the block party's history. 5 To specify
the intention of their commentary, Sconnie Nation and
Underground looked for a recognizable image of Mayor Soglin to

46 Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1044 (W.D. Wis.

2013).
47
1Id. at 1045.
4

8 id.

49 Id. at 1045-46.

s 0 Id. at 1046.
s' Kienitz, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.
52 Id. at 1046-47.
s Id. at 1046.
54
id.
s Id. at 1047.
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include on the apparel, and they found the photograph taken by
Kienitz on the official City of Madison website.5 6 Sconnie Nation
downloaded and altered the photograph, making Mayor Soglin's
face green against a black background, outlining the image in blue,
and adding the phrase "Sorry for Partying" in multicolored text.57
Kienitz later discovered that someone had created a shirt featuring
his photograph of Mayor Soglin and Kienitz subsequently filed an
application for federal registration of his copyright in the original
Soglin photograph.
1. District Court Decision
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin held that three of the fair use factors (the purpose and
character of the use, the amount and substantiality of the portion
taken, and the effect of the use on the potential market) weighed in
favor of Sconnie Nation, while the nature of the original work was
a neutral factor and did not weigh for or against either party.5 9 In
considering the first factor, the district court noted that the crux of
their inquiry was whether the new work "supersedes the original
work, or instead adds something new with a further purpose or of a
different character." 60 The court further noted that the defendants
did not use an exact copy of the photograph for profit, ' and that
the "robust transformative nature . . . tips this factor toward fair
use, even taking into account the fact that the shirts were a
commercial product." 6 2 The court commented on all of the
changes that were made to Kienitz's original photograph,
including a "monochromatic outline of Mayor Soglin's image in a
Paschke-eque neon green, similar in appearance to a photographic
negative,"63 and that the defendants used the original photograph
"as raw material to create something entirely new with a different

56

Kienitz, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.
id.
5
1Id. at 1048.
59
Id. at 1055.
57

60

Id. at 1049.

61 Kienitz,
62

965 F. Supp. 2d at 1050.

Id. at 1051.

63

1 d. at 1050.
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aesthetic, message and meaning."64 With regards to the market
effect factor, the district court held that seeing the images next to
one another was enough to realize that the shirts "were not a
substitute for and did not reduce the demand for Kienitz's
photographic portrait . . . "65 The district court supported this
assertion by citing Campbell, wherein the Supreme Court stated
that in works that are truly transformative, the new work is not
likely to affect the market for the original because parodies and
originals usually "serve different market functions." 66
2. Seventh CircuitDecision
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision but
Judge Easterbrook attested that.
used different reasoning. 6 7
transformative use "is not one of the statutory factors," 68 and went'
on to say that the Seventh Circuit is skeptical of the approach.
adopted by the court in Cariou because skewing the fair use
analysis heavily toward the transformative use factor could
potentially override § 106 of the Copyright Act's protection for
derivative works. 6 9 The Seventh Circuit further held that the most
important of the four fair use factors explicitly mentioned in § 107
of the Copyright Act is the market effect factor. 7 0 The court
concluded that apparel is not a substitute for the original
photograph 7 1 because Kienitz never argued that he planned to
license his photograph for apparel purposes nor did Kienitz argue
that Sconnie Nation's products decreased the demand for the
original photograph or the demand for any other use of that
photograph.7 2 Judge Easterbrook stated that the defendants did not
need to use Kienitz's photograph of Mayor Soglin as they could
have taken their own picture, and that the fair use defense was not
intended to protect "lazy appropriators" but to "facilitate a class of
64 id.
6

1Id. at 1054.

66

Kienitz, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 1054 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591).
Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 760 (7th Cir. 2014).
6
1Id. at 758.
67

69 id.
70id

71

Id. at 759.

72 Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 759.
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uses that would not be possible if users always had to negotiate
with copyright proprietors." 73 The opinion concluded by stating
that the infringement by Sconnie Nation might impact Kientz's
long term commercial market for the picture, but this "is not
enough to offset the fact that, by the time defendants were done,
almost none of the copyrighted work remained." 74
B. Questioning the Relevance of Transformative Use to the
Fair Use Analysis
In Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation, LLC., the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals contended that "asking whether something is
transformative or not.. .could override § 106(2) of the Copyright
Act, which protects derivative works."7 5 To reiterate, in Campbell,
the Supreme Court described transformative use as whether the
new work "adds something new, with a further purpose or
different character." 76 More recently, other courts have decided
transformative use exists "where the defendant uses a copyrighted
work in a different context to serve a different function than the
original." 77 The Court also stated in Campbell that transformative
uses are "at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of
breathing space within the confines of copyright." 7 8 The Supreme
Court has further articulated how to balance the other factors with
the transformative use aspect of the first factor: "the more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of
the other facts, like commercialism, that may weigh against a
finding of fair use." 79 Since the Campbell decision, courts have
taken note of the transformative use analysis, and that analysis has
become the dispositive factor of the fair use determination in many
cases.so
7

Id.

74 Id. at 760.
7
1d. at 758.

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572.
n Warner Bros. Ent., Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 541 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
79
1 d. at 569.
80 Jeremy Kudon, Note, Form Over Function:Expanding the
Transformative
Use Testfor Fair Use, 80 B.U. L. REV. 579, 583 (2000).
76
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However, given the broad language of the Copyright Act,
concerns regarding the potential implications on derivative works,
such as those expressed by Judge Easterbrook in Sconnie Nation,
are to be expected.8 ' Concern over the implications of the
transformative use inquiry on the issue of derivative works might
itself stem from the Copyright Act which defines a "derivative
work" as one "based upon one or more preexisting works, such as
a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may
be recast, transformed, or adapted." 8 2 While the first portion of the
definition illustrates what kinds of changes to a prior work would
constitute a derivative work, the latter half significantly broadens
the scope of the definition.8 3
Many court opinions have found that transformative use is
different from merely transforming a prior work into a derivative
work. In Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publishing Group,
for example, defendants created The Seinfeld Aptitude Test, a book
of 643 trivia questions meant to test the reader's knowledge and
memory of the characters and the events in the popular television
sitcom. 84 The court there found that the defendants' work had
"transformed Seinfeld's expression into trivia quiz book form with
little, if any, transformative purpose," and concluded that this
factor weighed against a finding of fair use.8 5 The court noted that
the defendants used at least some iota of creative expression, so
that they had potentially created a derivative work. However, in
order to clarify any potential confusion with the term
"transformative," the court stated that "[a]lthough derivative works
that are subject to the author's copyright transform an original
work into a new mode of presentation, such works-unlike works
of fair use-take expression for purposes that are not
'transformative."' 86 The court unambiguously precluded the view
R. Anthony Reese, Transformativenessand the Derivative Work Right, 31
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 494 (2007-2008).
82 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2014) (defining "derivative work").
8

83 Reese, supran.81, at 468.
84

Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Pub. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir.

1998).
"Id. at 143.
86

id.
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that the particular transformation utilized in the production of a
derivative work would unavoidably also count towards making
that new work a transformative use within the framework of fair
use analysis. 87
In Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books, defendants
wrote a book called The Cat NOT in the Hat, and used the writing
style of Dr. Seuss' The Cat in the Hat in order to tell the story of
the O.J. Simpson murder trial.88 The district court found that the
new work seemed to be a classic example of a derivative work
because the defendants took the main character from the
copyrighted work and placed that character in a new setting to tell
their new story.89 However, the Ninth Circuit found that the
plaintiff prevailed on its primafacie infringement claim because
although the content of the original work was transformed, there
was no effort to create a transformative work, as the new work did
not make any reference to the original in the sense of a parody, but
merely utilized the prior work's main character and writing style. 90
This case is yet another example of a circuit court distinguishing
between the transformation elements of derivative works from the
transformation required for a transformative use. These two cases,
and fair use analysis cases generally, do not tend to consider the
transformation of the original copyrighted work in the degree of
transformation inquiry.91
However, the rationale used in Kientz undermining the
relevancy of the "transformative use" analysis in Cariou, is flawed
and problematic. First, although the Cariou case is different from
other transformative use cases because of Prince's testimony,
which suggested that he did not purposefully intend to comment
on the original work, the Campbell decision did not constrain
transformative use with a prior intent or aforethought requirement
on behalf of the alleged infringer. 92 Second, although the term
"transformative use" does not appear in the text of § 106 of the
87

Reese, supra n.81, at 471-72.
Dr. Seuss Enter's., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.

1997).
9
Id. at 1397.
90 -Id. at 1401.
91 Reese, supra n.81, at
468.
92

Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 350, 352.
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Copyright Act, the Seventh Circuit fails to appreciate the specific
legislative intent in creating a set of four non-exclusive factors to
be part of fair use analysis. 9 3 Congressional records show that
Congress did not want to create a rigid fair use analysis, especially
"during a period of rapid technological change." 94 Furthermore,
the Congressional record emphasizes that a rigid fair use standard
would not be appropriate due to "the endless variety of situations
and combinations of circumstances that can rise in particular
cases." 95 Congress sought to codify a fair use standard that would
retain its relevance into the modem age, and granted judges a
measure of discretion for determining fair use under the unique
facts and circumstances of each individual case.
C. Primacy of the Market Effect
In Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, Judge Easterbrook
contends that he "think[s] it best to stick with the statutory list, of
which the most important usually is the fourth (market effect)."9 6
Judge Easterbrook further details how the market effect factor
should be analyzed based on "whether the contested use is a
complement to the protected work (allowed) rather than a
The court then concludes that the
substitute for it (prohibited)."9
t-shirts with the new work are not a substitute for the original
photograph of Mayor Soglin and that Kienitz did not contend that
defendants interrupted a plan to license the work for apparel. 98
There are several potential issues with this analysis of the
market effect factor. First, if the Seventh Circuit truly wants to
step back to a more statutorily authentic fair use standard, there is
a larger hurdle to overcome: the statutory text of the fourth factor
reads "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work." 99 If the statute requires that judges
"shall include" 00 consideration of all four factors, why has "effect
9 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 (1976).
94
Id. at 5680.

95 id.
96

Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758.
Id.
9
Id. at 759.
99 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
100 17 U.S.C. § 107.
97
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upon the potential market"o'0 been almost exclusively interpreted
as harm on the potential market? It is difficult to argue that
statutory authenticity is important and then chose to ignore the
relevance of clear statutory language. Second, analysis of the
market effect factor can be flawed. Under the fourth factor, judges
may consider the effect on the current or potential market for the
work.1 0 2 The problem with this analysis is that it can be construed
very broadly. It is possible to hypothesize a potential future
market for any specific work. To argue that future potential
markets are relevant in market effect analysis has the power to
potentially undermine the dissemination and public welfare goals
of copyright law. The fourth factor is underpinned by circular
logic, and this makes applying the factor problematic.' 03
In Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document
Services, Inc., the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals heard a case
regarding a commercial copy shop that reproduced large amounts
of scholarship, e.g., textbooks, bound them into coursepacks, and
sold them to students without notifying the copyright holder or
paying licensing fees.1 04 The majority found that the use did not
constitute fair use, and infringed the copyrights of the textbook
authors. However, Judge Ryan, writing for the dissent, reiterates
the original panel opinion which summarized the circularity
argument of the market effect factor by stating that "[t]he right to
permission fees is precisely what is at issue here. It is circular to
argue that a use is unfair, and a fee therefore required, on the basis
that the publisher is otherwise deprived of a fee." 05 When the
market effect factor is the only relevant fair use factor - either
because the facts of the case render the other factors inconclusive
or because a court believes that the market effect factor is

17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
See, e.g., Sony v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 453 (1984).
103 Anthony Davis Jr., Fair Use: Articulating the Liberal Approach, PORTAL:
101

102

LIBRARIES AND THE ACADEMY 121, 125 (2012),

https://www.press.jhu.edu/journals/portal-libraries-and-theacademy/portalpr
e_print/current/articles/12.2davis.pdf
104 Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 99 F.3d
1381, 1408 (1996).
5Id. at 1407 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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"[usually] the most important"l 0 6 - the reality of the market effect
argument's circularity becomes apparent.
In American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., another case
where the circularity issue of factor four was evident, the Second
Circuit found the photocopying of scientific journals to be used by
Texaco researchers was not a fair use. 1 0 7 However, when the court
addressed the market effect factor, it found that only a minimal
amount of subscriptions had been lost from the copying, but large
earnings were lost from the market for licensing fees for individual
articles.1 08 Although the court attempted to address the circularity
problem, the majority found that they only had to consider
reasonable or likely to be developed markets, and that the market
for licensing works was reasonable or likely to be developed. 10 9
Judge Jacob's dissent argued that the circularity problem was not
avoided, because the market for licensing can be reasonably
expected to develop if the court rejects Texaco's fair use defense,'
and the court cannot hold a particular use as infringing unless there
is an existing market that can be harmed.1 10 While the kind of
circularity problem described within the market effect factor in
Princeton University Press or American Geophysical Union is not
directly at issue in the Kienitz case, assigning prime importance to
a factor that frequently faces such potential for circular reasoning
is a disservice to the goals of copyright law.
IV.

FUTURE IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION

The consequence of Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC is that the
fair use analysis, which is already wrought with ambiguity, is
clouded with even more uncertainty. By directly rejecting the
transformative use trend, the Seventh Circuit created a circuit split.
The Second Circuit, as evident in the Cariou decision, follows
Campbell and incorporates a transformative use inquiry into its fair
use analysis, while the Seventh Circuit now gives more credence
The Supreme Court has denied
to the market effect factor.
106

107

Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d at 758.
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).

's Id at 930-31.
09 Id at 930.
0Id at 937 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
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certiorari on the Kienitz case, which leaves the messy question of
transformative fair use stuck in its current form.
More broadly, if the trend ignited by the Seventh Circuit
court continues in future cases - if the fair use analysis continues
to become primarily dependent on whether the contested use is a
"complement" rather a "supplement" - this may have significant
implications for the purposes of American copyright law as we
understand them. It is possible to have a use that is transformative
in the sense of the first factor of the fair use analysis, but that
might also impinge on the potential market for the original use. In
such a situation, which aim of copyright law prevails:
incentivizing creation, or allowing access for the public welfare of
society? Furthermore, due to the circular logic intrinsic in the
fourth factor analysis of market effect, concerns may arise given
that there can be a potential future market for anything.
Furthermore, the Kienitz decision is problematic because it does
not clarify the questions that remain with regard to the market
effect factor. For example, the decision does not clarify how to
determine if there is a market or potential market, and it does not
clarify how to properly quantify the likelihood of harm to such
markets. The opinion also does not address the problems of
circular logic and argument that anything can have a specific
market. If it is true that the market effect factor is more relevant
because it is explicitly mentioned in the Copyright Act then should
it not be easier to quantify and recognize?
In conclusion, although Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation, LLC was
correctly decided, the Seventh Circuit's rationale for a finding of
fair use, which dismantles the trend of courts to engage in a
transformative use analysis, was both contrary to Supreme Court
precedent and unhelpful to the broader question of applying fair
use with some consistency. The Kienitz opinion is incorrect in its
assertion that transformative use analysis will impinge upon the
statutorily protected right of derivative works, due to the fact that
court opinions since Campbell have shown that judges can pull
apart questions of "transformative use" from issues of whether a
derivate work was created. Furthermore, although some might
consider application of the market effect factor more objective
than the transformative use factor, the market effect factor is
oftentimes based on problematic circular logic. Moreover, if the
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true goal of the Kienitz decision is to return to authentic statutory
interpretation of the fair use standard, "market effect" needs to be
analyzed in light of potential market harm and potential market
help. When courts give any one factor primacy, they ignore the
Congressional intent for the fair use analysis, which is based on
the balancing of all the statutory factors.
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